This visual securitisation not only heightens fears of dependency but also primes certain audiences – in the US, Japan and France, for instance – to view China’s presence as a direct challenge to their interests.
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Brendon J. Cannon, Khalifa University
Global power dynamics in Africa are shifting, with China eclipsing the influence of the US and France. China has become Africa’s single largest trading partner.
In response, media and policymakers in traditionally dominant states are increasingly using maps drenched in red or stamped with Chinese flags to depict Beijing’s expanding footprint. One map reproduced by a US congressional committee, for instance, showed Beijing’s influence and reach across the continent in red stripes.
But these visuals oversimplify a complex reality. This is an issue I explore in a new study. For over a decade, I have researched the interactions of sub-Saharan Africa with other states like Turkey, Arab Gulf states, Japan and China.
In a recent paper I explored the use of maps that have been created of Africa showing China’s projects across the continent. I argue that, by overlaying Chinese flags on maps depicting Africa and its 54 states, media and policymakers turn economic ties into a visual representation of foreign encroachment.
This process is called securitisation – the framing of something as a threat, even if it’s not one.
This visual securitisation not only heightens fears of dependency but also primes certain audiences – in the US, Japan and France, for instance – to view China’s presence as a direct challenge to their interests.
Certain threats – like terrorist groups or nuclear weapons – are self-evident. China’s presence in many African states, however, is different: if it’s a threat, who is threatened and why? Do Chinese-built roads or railways – and the debt African states accrue for this infrastructure – constitute the threat?
My research shows that the answer to these questions is: it depends.
Portraying China’s presence in Africa with flags on maps can distort African states’ sovereignty and their power to make decisions based on national interests. This visual portrayal reduces these countries to arenas of global power competition. It fails to recognise them as strategic actors.
China tops imports to African states
On the other hand, my research shows that China’s role may not be entirely benign.
My study focuses mostly on east Africa, to include the Horn of Africa. Much of Beijing’s engagement here remains primarily economic (as it does in west, central and southern Africa). However, China’s growing control over critical infrastructure and digital networks, and its pursuit of military footholds near strategic maritime routes, present real security concerns.
Policymakers need to separate legitimate risks from exaggerated securitisation narratives. This would help them avoid the pitfalls of reactionary policies.
Presenting China as a threat in Africa has three negative consequences.
First, it erodes the idea and reality of African sovereignty and agency. Maps portraying Africa as overrun by China suggest that governments and civil society are mere bystanders unable to negotiate their own foreign and domestic agendas.
The reality is that countries like Kenya actively engage with China to attract investments for development projects, and to balance their relations with other international actors like the US and Japan.
The result of securitisation is that American or Japanese policymakers, for instance, have begun to view Africa through the lens of their strategic competition with China. This is evident in Washington’s foreign policy rhetoric, for example. This increasingly frames African states not just as partners but also as strategic battlegrounds in the growing US-China rivalry. The risk is that African countries may start being treated as passive players.
Second, securitisation inflates the perception of China as a global security threat.
The repeated use of maps with Chinese flags covering ports, railways and industrial zones creates an exaggerated image of unchecked expansion. These maps fail to show the host of other external states operating on the continent.
The US, multiple European states, Japan, India, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea all have significant interests in Africa. While China is by far the largest, most prominent external actor, with the widest reach throughout Africa, it’s been singled out because of the perceived threats its presence in Africa may pose to the west.
Third, securitisation can lead to knee-jerk reactions to limit China’s presence rather than engage constructively with Beijing’s investments in Africa. These reactions can result in ill-advised attempts by China’s competitors to push projects that don’t correspond to the needs of African states. This partly explains Ethiopia’s strained relations with the west. Sanctions and aid cuts over the Tigray conflict fuelled a pivot toward China and Russia.
Securitisation raises valid concerns, but my research also underscores genuine security risks related to China’s presence in Africa. These shouldn’t be overlooked.
China’s growing role and embeddedness in Africa’s digital ecosystem presents a double-edged sword, for instance. Huawei and other Chinese companies have contributed to Africa’s telecommunications and digital transformation. But these investments also increase Beijing’s potential influence over data security, cyber governance and information flows. These give China the option to exploit networks for surveillance, intelligence gathering or political coercion.
Chinese-funded, built or operated infrastructure, ports and military bases
China’s expanding control over dual-use infrastructure is another concern. Chinese-operated ports in Djibouti, for instance, can be used for commercial and military purposes. They potentially grant Beijing a strategic foothold in key maritime corridors, such as the Red Sea. China could restrict access to these ports in times of conflict. Or use them to extend its naval footprint, similar to what it’s done in the South China Sea.
It’s China’s pursuit of other military facilities beyond its bases in Djibouti that will have the most serious implications for African states’ sovereignty. This is part of a deliberate Chinese strategy to expand its global power projection and protect access to critical resources like oil and gas.
Agreements on military facilities may end up undermining and even challenging African agency of action. The addition of Chinese ships and soldiers alongside the growing presence of US, European, Indian, Japanese and other regional naval forces could escalate tensions. It also risks entangling African states in power rivalries that aren’t in their national interests.
China’s presence in Africa has been securitised through maps drenched in red and stamped with flags, framing its engagement as a looming threat rather than a complex geopolitical reality. However, the real challenge for African states is ensuring that China’s growing influence – especially in infrastructure, digital networks, and security – does not erode their sovereignty. Whether Beijing’s presence becomes an opportunity or a liability will depend on how effectively African governments assert their national interests in shaping these partnerships on their own terms.
Brendon J. Cannon, Associate Professor, Khalifa University
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
